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speaking speeds of the individuals, which vary a great deal, as has been previously shown. III., besides being an inferior adder, is a much slower speaker. This is an unessential factor here, since the experiments are not intended as a comparison of individuals, but of tests.

The true test of tests is found in their variability as illustrated below. The diurnal variations in the column test are not directly equably comparable with the others, since the individual measures are here themselves the average of five associations. As above, X. has no diurnal variation, the figures being simply the average for the ten subjects, but their results are here allowed to enter into the average. The number of errors made in each type of test for all subjects is also given. As a result, the column test is inferior on all counts; the increment test is superior in constancy of the individual associations and freedom from diurnal variations. It is also a more flexible test since the numbers to be added may be varied at will, and it is equally convenient for subtraction. It is inferior to the pair test in freedom from errors, for although the absolute number is less, it is greater in proportion to the number of associations.[1]

TABLE II.

	Mean Variability of Ratios of 1st and 2d Half-times.			Diurnal Mean Variation in Amount of Work Done.					
	Column Test.	Pair Test.	Increment Test.	Column Test.		Pair Test.		Increment Test.	
				a	*b*	*a*	*b*	*a*	*b*
I.	.298	.118	.102	.99	1.43	4.6	4.6	4.2	2.4
II.	.980	.147	.106	.86	.51	3.3	2.4	1.5	2.0
III.	.251	.092	.092	.55	.65	1.4	3.3	1.8	1.7
IV.	.180	.075	.079	.60	.85	2.6	2.7	1.3	1.7
X.	.112	.141	.112	2.00	2.40	7.3	9.5	5.2	5.8
Av.	.188	.116	.098	1.00	1.17	3.8	4.5	2.8	2.7
Errors	31	16	13						

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DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR FITE ON THE EXAGGERATION OF THE SOCIAL

HEGEL and Spencer have added much to the thought of the time about the social consciousness, but the former's theory of the state and the latter's idea of the social organism have probably had less to do with it than their genetic point of view. A very little thought about the beginning and growth of the general form of reflective knowledge is apt to plunge one deep into the 'exaggeration of the social,' that is to say, into the hope of finding the story of the unfolding of mind unbroken when traced through the social life of man.

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[1] These experiments were performed in the psychological laboratory of Columbia University. Standard blanks for the pair and increment tests have been prepared, and are included among the psychological blanks issued by the laboratory.

That there is a difference of a formal kind between earlier and later thought is presupposed, and indeed obvious, and we soon come in the study of the matter to a point where we see that this is not merely a difference in the number of things thought about and the number of recognized bonds between them. We soon see that it is a difference in the kind of knowledge we have of everything. It is a formal difference. Early awareness of things is, in the main, an *intentio prima animi,* while that which comes later is an *intentio secunda animi.* The former is 'acquaintance with,' the latter is 'knowledge about.' The former is immediate, comparatively transient, simply and straightway joined to the muscular movements which begin with it; the latter is more detached, farther away from visible action and things, more subtly and highly differentiated and organized. The former lacks objectivity and universality, the latter has these marks. The former is unreflective and comparatively unshaped by the give-and-take of gregarious life, the latter is marked by forms which are inseparable from the consciousness of a multipolar self in which the individual is nobly one with his kind.

Perhaps this difference is characterized when we say that the early knowledge of children and the race is immediate, while that which comes later is reflective. How could the association of the individual human being with lower kinds, with plants and with inanimate things, ever lead to that consciousness of self which is the most important thing about reflective knowledge? It might lead to such language as the songs of birds or the bark and cry of wolves, but such language is too merely expressive of feeling to contribute much to the universality of knowledge. It might lead to ideas which, taken together, would constitute some associative kind of 'system,' but this could never be such ideas and such a system as science, philosophy and common sense make. It might lead to a vague consciousness of self, but not to the self-thought which functions everywhere and always in the life of reason. Suppose 'the relations between myself and natural objects are . . . precisely the same in kind as my relations to my neighbor,' does it follow that the exercise of merely instinctive and impulsive activities, including the imitation of plants, animals and things, would lead, in a non-human environment and within the life-span of a generation, to such thoughts of self-in-relations as make up my consciousness of myself? Could such contacts with the world, and such knowledge as is derivable therefrom, ever result in that objectivity and universality which are the distinguishing marks of the world of reflection? Not in less time, we should say, than it has already taken the race to develop man's reflective powers and knowledge.

Professor Fite thinks that Robinson on his native island and innocent, from the beginning, of social intercourse 'would not have lacked the conditions for a mental development of the same kind, though of minor degree, as we now possess.'[1] But it would have been easier to understand this point if he had clearly defined and illustrated the words 'minor degree.' Our language, general ideas, processes of judgment, and self-consciousness all depend upon the imitative contact, repeated by each generation, of the individual with the built-up traditions of his time as these are embodied in language and the institutions of society. How, then, without this peculiar imitative intercourse, could Robinson ever come to the mental development we are familiar with? Truly, he would have to be a genius of inconceivable originality.

Professor Fite writes that 'in making use of the various natural objects—the *same* object at different times and for different purposes—he would be compelled to develop a language and a system of ideas.' Let us, however, while pointing out the 'sociologist's' and other fallacies, not fall into the 'psychologist's.' For the early thought of children and the race there is no 'same object' such as this statement implies, that is, such as would compel Robinson to develop a language and a system of general ideas. 'Same objects,' such as compel language and the systematization of ideas, exist only for reflective minds such as children must imitatively acquire through language, observation and a mastery of the social uses and meanings of things.

Of course, if you assume that Robinson all alone on his native island has the same social *milieu* as you and I, you beg the question. For this is tantamount to denying the presupposition upon which the question as to the origin and growth of reflection and reflective forms of knowledge rests. It is tantamount to saying that the power of reflection is congenital and native to the mind. You assume, with Kant and the rationalists, that the mind makes its world of reflective knowledge.

Hence, in our genetic psychology of human reason and knowledge, we should probably say more and more about the influence of social life upon thought and knowledge; while in our logic and epistemology we ought to say nothing at all about it. All knowledge, in the logician's sense of the term, is social, reflective and general. The logic of the dog and the epistemology of the cuttlefish would be impossible without an entire change in the connotation of these terms. It is just possible that these questions of origin and growth will be treated in the logic and epistemology of the future, as they are treated in Baldwin's recent 'Thought and Things, or Genetic Logic'; but we can not face this possibility without seeing that in that case the logic and epistemology of the nineteenth and preceding centuries must remain for all time mere characteristics of those centuries. The logic and epistemology of the future will, in that case, become humanized and psychological to an extent never dreamed of by Mill and Hamilton.

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[1] See his 'Exaggeration of the Social,' this JOURNAL, Vol. IV., p. 393.

I am glad to say that I find myself much more in accord with Professor Fite's definition of the 'sociologist's fallacy,' his second point, and yet am constrained to add that the term social has a more objective significance in sociology than in psychology and logic. All the cooperative activities of animal groups are for sociology social, whether or not they involve a consciousness of the distinction between the individual and others, while in psychology and logic only that knowledge can properly be called social which is reflective, that is, which rests upon and recognizes that distinction.

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SOCIETIES

THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY

THE Western Philosophical Association held its seventh annual meeting in Chicago, on March 29 and 30, in affiliation with the North Central Psychological Association. Both associations were the guests of the University of Chicago and were pleasantly housed in the dormitories. The meeting was perhaps the strongest ever held in the west by these associations. As many of those who took part in the program have failed to furnish abstracts, this report is not an adequate record of the proceedings. The reason for this is mainly that a large number of the papers had been accepted by various philosophical journals before the meeting. Of the following papers no abstracts have been received: 'The Ego and Empirical Psychology' (presidential address), by W. B. Pillsbury; 'Gar-